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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
opened a Pandora's Box of liability and the courts will be forced
to retreat to their former position.
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - HEART FLUTTER AS PERSONAL
INJURY BY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Plaintiff-employee brought suit to obtain workmen's com-
pensation benefits for injury sustained during the course of his
employment. Employee's normal duties consisted of heavy
manual labor under conditions of extreme heat. While perform-
ing these duties, he felt his heart quivering. Believing it not to
be serious, he completed his shift and also worked the next day,
experiencing similar symptoms. The next day, his day off, he
drank a soft drink and fainted. Examination revealed that he
was suffering from impure flutter and auricular fibrillation.'
He was advised to avoid physical exertion for an indefinite
period. He then brought this suit for compensation. Medical
testimony established that the employee, unknown to him, had
suffered arteriosclerois for some time prior to these events and
that heavy exertion could send a diseased heart into fibrillation.
There was also testimony that the type of work which the em-
ployee was doing hastened his entering into a period of disability
and that the quivering experienced at work marked the onset
of fibrillation. The trial court allowed compensation.2  On ap-
peal, held, affirmed. 3 The medical testimony had established
because here the administrative problem is greatly multiplied. In a recent decision
liability was denied where the sovereignty was aware of the particular places or
areas being dangerous to particular classes of citizens. Langer v. City of New
York, 9 Misc.2d 1002, 171 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1958).
1. Flutter and fibrillation occur when the pacemaker begins sending out a
greatly increased number of impulses so that the atria attempt to contract more
rapidly than the ventricles can pump as a result of which they pump at their own
rate which is usually grossly irregular. Neldare v. Schuylkill Products Company,
107 So.2d 487, 489 (La. App. 1958).
2. Employee was held to be totally disabled. Medical testimony established
that he was unable to return to any work requiring the physical exertion neces-
sary in his previous employment. A worker will be regarded as totally disabled
if he is unable to do work reasonably of the same kind and character as that
which his training, education, experience, and status in life qualify him to perform,
in the customary way without any unusual difficulty or pain. Malone, Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation, page 327. Compensation was computed on a five day
week of $50, being 65% of $50 or $32.50 per week.
3. The judgment was modified to the extent of raising the award to $35 per
week by basing compensation on a six day week. An injured workman is entitled
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that the employee had suffered an accident within the meaning
of the workmen's compensation act. Neldare v. Schuylkill Prod-
ucts Company, 107 So.2d 487 (La. App. 1958).
Under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, an em-
ployee not otherwise excluded by the act is entitled to compensa-
tion if he "receives personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment."' 4 Accident is defined as
"an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or vio-
lently, with or without human fault and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury." 5 The classification of heart
attacks as accidents has required a liberal construction of this
definition. There is of course no problem in finding an accident
where a heart attack is brought on by an impact from the out-
side.6 But it is now well settled that even without any such im-
pact, strain or exertion can furnish the necessary violence.7 The
element of violence has also been found where the attack has been
brought on by fright." The requirement that an accident be an
unexpected and unforeseen event would seem to indicate that it
must be unusual in character. However, it is well settled in Lou-
isiana that strain or exertion resulting in damage to the heart
need not be different in kind or intensity from that normally
experienced by the worker in carrying out his duties in order for
to compensation at the rate of pay in effect on the actual day of the injury,
based not upon the number of days per week he was employed but upon the
number of days he could possibly have secured employment had he not been in-
jured, or six days a week. Jarrell v. Travelers Insurance Company, 218 La. 531,
50 So.2d 22, 23 (1950).
4. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
5. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950).
6. See Clifton v. Arnold, 87 So.2d 386 (La. App. 1956) (fall at work resulted
in coronary occlusion eight days later). Where compensation is denied in such
cases the reason is usually lack of causal connection, e.g., Keener v. Fidelity and
Casualty Company of New York, 96 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1957) (employee caught
his hand in machinery nine months before fatal heart attack) ; Brown v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company, 96 So.2d 357 (La. App. 1957) (acid burns ten
days before attack) ; Keene v. Carraway and McDougald Lumber Company, 95
So.2d 849 (La. App. 1957) (employee fell and was struck on the leg by a cant
hook twelve days before heart attack).
7. See Roberson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company, 90 So.2d 465 (La.
App. 1956) (walking hurriedly brought on heart attack) ; Hemphill v. Tremont
Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625 (1946) (heart attack from carrying
rolls of composition paper up a ladder). See also Hastings v. Homewood Develop-
ment Company, 84 So.2d 883 (La. App. 1956) ; Sepulvado v. Mansfield Hard-
wood Lumber Company, 75 So.2d 529 (La. App. 1954) ; Sharp v. Esso Standard
Oil Company, 72 So.2d 601 (La. App. 1954) ; Hester v. Tremont Lumber Com-
pany, 15 So.2d 94 (La. App. 1943); Murray v. Mengel Company, 9 So.2d 818
(La. App. 1942) ; Ozbolt v.. Weber-King Mfg. Co., 193 So. 383 (La. App. 1940).
8. See Johnson v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company,
161 So. 667 (La. App. 1935) (violence was found in both the event causing the
fright and in the effect on the heart itself).
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there to be an accident.9 A number of cases have stated a re-
quirement that such normal duties be physically strenuous or
performed under conditions of excessive heat in order for there
to be an accident in the absence of an unusual occurrence. 10
Whatever validity this qualification ever had, beyond the re-
quirement that there be causal connection between the work and
the disability, would seem to have been eliminated by the case of
Roberson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company." The court
there recognized the rule that the work must be strenuous, but
held that the degree of strenuousness required was a relative
matter depending on the condition of the claimant. To one in
the condition of the heart patient-employee in that case, any
labor, however slight, was heavy and strenuous. Where disability
is brought about as the cumulative effect of repeated strains
or exertion or constant exposure to heat, gas, or deleterious sub-
stances so that the worker's physical condition is gradually
eroded until he is finally disabled, there is presented a situation
where causation is present but where it is difficult to find an
accident. Where symptoms of such a condition have appeared
gradually, compensation has generally been denied on the ground
that the employee has suffered an occupational disease rather
than an accident.1 2 However, where the effect of repeated strain
or regular exposure to harmful substances goes unnoticed over
9. Roberson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company, 90 So.2d 465 (La. App.
1956); Hastings v. Homewood Development Company, 84 So.2d 883 (La. App.
1956) Hemphill v. Tremont Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625 (1946) ;
Sepulvado v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company, 75 So.2d 529 (La. App.
1954); Sharp v. Esso Standard Oil Company, 72 So.2d 601 (La. App. 1954);
Hester v. Tremont Lumber Company, 15 So.2d 94 (La. App. 1943) ; Murray v.
Mengel Company, 9 So.2d 818 (La. App. 1942) ; Ozbolt v. Webre-King Mfg. Co.,
193 So. 383 (La. App. 1940). Moreover, this rule is not limited to heart cases,
e.g., Renfrow v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 155 So. 291 (La. App. 1934) (com-
pensation allowed for loss of vision caused by strain of normal duties).
10. Hastings v. Homewood Development Company, 84 So.2d 883 (La. App.
1956) ; Henderson v. Dalton, 47 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1950) ; Hemphill v. Tremont
Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625 (1946); Murray v. Mengel Com-
pany, 9 So.2d 818 (La. App. 1942) ; Lynn v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Company, 192
So. 764 (La. App. 1939).
11. 90 So.2d 465 (La. App. 1956).
12. In all such cases considered on the merits the injury resulted from pro-
longed contact with deleterious substances or gases. See Martin v. Brown Paper
Mill Company, Inc., 35 So.2d 140 (La. App. 1948) (where eczema resulted from
exposure to alkali over a period of time) ; Mitchell v. Department of Highways,
27 So.2d 646 (La. App. 1946) (oil acne resulted from contact with oil impreg-
nated with dirt and grime over a period of several years) ; Freiss v. Lone Star
Cement Company, 161 So. 209 (La. App. 1935) (dermatitis caused by contact
with cement dust for four years). But see Valentine v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 90
So.2d 442 (La. App. 1956) (where petition alleging that strenuous duties aggra-
vated pulmonary tuberculosis stated no cause of action predicated on a theory of
accident). Act 532 of 1952 amended the Louisiana Compensation Act so as to
allow compensation for certain designated occupational diseases.
NOTES
a period of time until finally on some trivial occasion the
symptoms appear in full force, this occasion is regarded as an
accident and compensation is allowed.13 The causal conditions
may meet the test of accident, although not a specific event, if
they are limited to a specific period of time and are not con-
tinuous conditions of the employment. 14 The courts have on rare
occasions allowed compensation where the disability is the cumu-
lative effect of the continuous conditions of employment and
where the symptoms have appeared gradually, on the theory
that the worker has been subjected to a continuous series of
traumas amounting to individual accidents.15 Heart disorders
are generally of such a nature that there is a sudden appearance
of symptoms and there appear to be no cases in which compen-
sation was denied for a heart condition caused by the work done
by the employee because the court was unable to find that an
"accident" had occurred. The requirement that the accident
produce, at the time, objective symptoms of an injury has been
disregarded in strain cases where no objective symptoms were
produced at the time of the accident. 16
To be compensable, an injury must not only be "by accident"
but must also "arise out of and in the course of the employ-
ment.""17 The requirement that the accident arise in the course
of the employment refers to the time and place of the accident
and the activity in which the employee is engaged when the ac-
cident occurs.' 8 The requirement that it arise out of the employ-
13. See Biggs v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Company, Inc., 170 So. 273 (La.
App. 1936) (where worker's heavy duties caused his powers of resistance to
gradually weaken, ultimately resulting in hernia) ; Renfrow v. Caddo Police Jury,
155 So. 291 (La. App. 1934) (where duties aggravated hardening of the arteries
and high blood pressure which utimately resulted in the rupture of blood vessels
in eyes and blindness). MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 269
(1952).
14. Glover v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 10 So.2d 255 (La. App. 1942)
(where employee was allowed compensation for "shingles" caused by several days
exposure to intensive dust). But see Wynn v. Standard Roofing Company, 154
So. 668 (La. App. 1934) (where compensation was denied for severe aggravation
of athlete's foot after two or three days of walking on hot asphalt).
15. Harris v. Southern Carbon Company, 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935) (con-
stant friction of leather strap against ankle created a cancerous condition which
gradually became worse until disability resulted); York v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours and Company, 37 So.2d 68 (La. App. 1948) (repeated lifting resulted
in gradual breakdown of an intervertebral disc with resultant pain increasing until
the employee was unable to work).
16. Rochell v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Company, 188 So. 429, 431
(La. App. 1939). See also Woodward v. Kansas City Bridge Company, 3 So.2d
221 (La. App. 1941) (employee awarded compensation for exposure to poison
ivy; no mention of absence of objective symptoms at the time).
17. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
18. See Fields v. Brown Paper Mill Company, 28 So.2d 755 (La. App. 1946)
19591
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
ment refers to the source of the risk or danger. 19 Where strain,
overexertion, or exposure to heat required by one's employment
results in heart damage, it would seem clear that this is the type
of risk against which the act should protect. Nevertheless, to
meet the "course of employment" requirement, there must be
some event which can be termed an accident which has occurred
at a time and place which can be considered at least tenuously
in the course of employment. Therefore, if a heart attack causing
death or disability occurred off the job it would seem that there
could be no recovery of compensation unless it could be traced
back to some event on the job which meets the requirements of
an accident. This could be either the cause - such as physical
impact or overexertion during a particular period of time, or the
effect - such as the sudden appearance of preliminary symp-
toms.20 Evidence sufficient to establish causation in fact between
the employment and the heart damage will almost certainly
establish some on-the-job event constituting such an accident. 21
(time) ; Wyatt v. Alabama Petroleum Corp., 2 La. App. 499 (1925) (place)
Sears v. Peytral, 151 La. 971, 92 So. 561 (1922) (activity).
19. See Myers v. Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company, 140 La. 937,
74 So. 256 (1917) (where it was held that the risk from which the injury re-
sulted must be greater for the workman than for a person not engaged in the
employment). But see Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19 (1932)
(where it was held that whether an accident arises out of the employment must
be determined by time, place, and circumstances). Professor Malone suggests that
the reconciliation of these two leading cases and cases following each is that the
Kern rule is applied where the employee is clearly in the course of his employment,
whereas the Myers rule is applied where his activities bring him barely within the
outer fringe of his employment. He contends that there is a close affinity of the
inquiries into "arising out of" and "in the course of" the employment and where
one is clearly present, compensation will be allowed although the other might be
only tenuously present. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 161,
192 (1952).
20. See note 13 supra as to the proposition that the sudden appearance of
symptoms can constitute an accident. See Note 14 supra as to the proposition
that an accident need not be a single event but may be causal conditons experienced
over a limited period of time. If the only way that the heart attack could be tied
to the employment was to show that the general working conditions had gradually
weakened the heart until it eventually gave way while the employee was off the
job, there would be no accident in the course of employment unless we could re-
gard the gradual weakening of the heart as a series of traumas constituting ac-
cidents. The courts have only rarely followed this line of reasoning in analogous
cases. See Note 15 supra.
21. Louisiana courts have on occasion stated that the attack occurred off the
job in denying compensation, but in such cases it appears that the court was not
convinced that the factor of causation in fact was present. See Keener v. Fidelity
and Casualty Company of New York, 96 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1957) (claimant
suffered heart attack eight months after getting his hand caught in machinery) ;
Hastings v. Homewood Development Company, 84 So.2d 883 (La. App. 1956)
(medical testimony established that the disease was degenerative only). But see
Seals v. City of Baton Rouge, 94 So.2d 478 (La. App. 1955). The court denied
compensation for death from a heart attack which occurred while the employee
was on a vacation and which had been brought on by worry over his forced re-
NOTES
Once an accident is found, any disability flowing therefrom is
compensable. 22
In heart attack cases, the crucial issue is usually causation
in fact. It is well settled that the employee who is abnormally
susceptible to injury by some weakness such as a heart condition
is entitled to the full protection of the act.28 All that is necessary
is to show that the accident aggravated the condition so as to
produce disability. Because of the technical nature of the issue
of causal relation between the employment and the disability in
heart cases, medical testimony is all important in determining
whether such a relationship exists. Trauma usually associated
with any strenuous employment has often been held to have
caused the disability or death of an employee with heart trouble.2 4
In the instant case, assuming the nature of the employee's
work caused the auricular fibrillation, the requirement of vio-
lence for an accident presents no problem since there was
violence to the heart. The employee was injured by carrying
out his normal duties, which were both strenuous and performed
under extreme heat. This clearly comes under the rule that in-
jury resulting from performance of normal duties is compensable
even if the requirement that the work be strenuous is considered
as having any validity. Although the nature of the employee's
condition was not discovered until after he had drunk a soft
drink on his day off and fainted, the evidence established that
the occasion on which he felt his heart quiver two days before
while performing his duties marked the onset of fibrillation.
The court seized on this sudden appearance of symptoms as con-
tirement. The basis of this decision was that the court did not feel that this was
the type of risk against which the act was designed to protect.
22. "'Injury' and 'Personal Injuries' includes only injuries by violence to the
physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as naturally result
therefrom." LA. R.S. 23:1021 (7) (1950). See generally MALONE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION C. 11.
23. E.g., Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Company, 94 So.2d 134 (La. App.
1957); Williams v. Russell, 87 So.2d 761 (La. App. 1956) ; Hemphill v. Tremont
Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625 (1946); Behan v. John B. Honor
Co., 143 La. 348, 78 So. 589 (1918).
24. See Roberson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company, 90 So.2d 465 (La.
App. 1956) (walking hurriedly); Sepulvado v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber
Company, 75 So.2d 529 (La. App. 1954) (cutting logs) ; Sharp v. Esso Standard
Oil Company, 72 So.2d 601 (La. App. 1952) (closing valve) ; Henderson v. E. L.
Dalton and Company, 47 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1950) (heating tar) ; Hemphill v.
Tremont Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625 (1946) (carrying rolls of
composition paper up a ladder) ; Hester v. Tremont Lumber Company, 15 So.2d
94 (La. App. 1943) (boiler making) ; Murray v. Mengel Company, 9 So.2d 818




stituting the accident. It is submitted that this was proper since
the fact that this employee was peculiarly susceptible to injury
because he was suffering from arteriosclerosis, perhaps aggra-
vated by the cumulative effect of his duties, is immaterial if the
acts which he was performing at the time pushed him over the
brink into a disabling condition. The fact that the full extent
of that disability did not appear at the time is likewise im-
material. Injury caused by the strenuous nature of the work
would seem to be the type of risk against which the act was
designed to protect. Since the resulting accident occurred on
the job, the course of employment requirement was satisfied.
The most important problem faced by the court was, of course,
causation in fact. The heart specialist who treated the employee
testified that the type of work which the employee had been
doing was condusive to precipitating flutter and fibrillation in
a heart affected by sclerosis. He testified that this condition is
rarely brought about without provocation and that the type of
work which the employee was doing on the night of the accident
would be provocation enough. The employer's company doctor
differed with the latter opinion, but admitted that violent effort
and exertion could and would send the heart into auricular fibril-
lation. The doctor who gave the employee the cardiogram which
established his condition testified that excessive physical exertion
or fatigue or strain could aggravate and could be a contributing
factor in such a condition. The plaintiff in a workmen's com-
pensation case has the burden of proof, but it is the general rule
that proof by probability is sufficient.2 5 In the light of this
medical testimony and the acknowledged fact that the employee's
work was highly strenuous, the court held, and rightly so, that
causation had been established.
In conclusion, this case demonstrates that in cases of injury
to the heart through exertion or heat the decisive question is
whether the disability was causally connected with the employ-
ment. Once this fact is established, the courts have little trouble,
in the usual case, finding an accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment so as to allow compensation.
William M. Nolen
25. Yaw v. Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., 26 So.2d 718 (La. App. 1946)
Kirk v. E. L. Bruce Company, 190 So. 840 (La. App. 1939) ; Terry v. Sparco
Oil Corp., 150 So. 391 (La. App. 1933) ; MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 252 (1952). But see Gardner v. Travelers' Insurance, 12 So.2d 830
(La. App. 1943).
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